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An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists found that Russia’s A7 payment network begins with cash collected at Moscow markets, including Sadovod, before routing funds abroad through banks, cryptocurrency intermediaries and companies in third countries. The report says A7 processed at least 58 metric tons of cash in one month at its peak; the precise month and the basis for converting that amount into a transaction total are not specified in the supplied material.
An investigation published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists describes how Russia’s A7 payment service uses cash collected at Moscow markets to fund international transfers, routing money through Promsvyazbank, cryptocurrency intermediaries and companies in third countries. The report says A7 handled at least 58 metric tons of cash in a single month at its peak, illustrating the scale of a payment network operating as sanctions restrict Russian access to conventional financial channels.
ICIJ journalists reviewed internal company documents and spoke with sources to reconstruct how money moves through A7’s network. Much of the cash, the investigation found, is collected at wholesale and retail markets in Moscow, including Sadovod, where many transactions are conducted in cash. A source familiar with the situation described the market to ICIJ as “simply a big client base.” The report says the cash comes from both individuals and businesses; it does not identify every payer or establish that all market transactions fund A7.
Documents reviewed by ICIJ refer to at least eight cash collection points as “departments.” Brokers count rubles brought in by vendors, pack them into numbered bags and send them by van with payment orders to an A7 processing center elsewhere in Moscow. About 50 cashiers record the money in A7’s counting system, the report says. The cash then goes to Promsvyazbank, or PSB, which stores it and credits A7’s accounts.
From there, the described route moves across borders. A7 uses foreign-registered intermediary companies, including firms in Kyrgyzstan that buy cryptocurrency through Grinex, an exchange linked to A7, according to the investigation. PSB supplies banking infrastructure for transfers to Kyrgyzstan and, when needed, loans and guarantees. Intermediaries in other countries, often in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, then exchange cryptocurrency for local currency and pay recipients. These details describe the route reported by ICIJ; they do not establish the source or destination of every individual transfer.
How A7 Moves Money Abroad
The reporting offers a concrete account of how a Russian payment intermediary can connect cash inside Russia to recipients abroad despite restrictions on ordinary bank transfers. It traces the process from market cash collection through a Russian bank and cryptocurrency intermediaries to third-country companies. That operational detail matters to policymakers, financial institutions and businesses monitoring sanctions exposure, because it identifies points in the chain where payments may pass through different jurisdictions and forms of money.
The scale figure also signals that the system handles substantial physical cash, though 58 metric tons is a weight, not a value. It should not be read as a monetary total, a count of transfers or a measure of the network’s monthly activity in general: the supplied report summary gives neither the month nor a conversion into rubles. The investigation’s findings may guide scrutiny of intermediaries and payment routes, but the material provided does not establish what enforcement steps, if any, will follow.
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A7’s Sanctions-Era Role
Western sanctions on Russian banks and payment systems, including disconnections from SWIFT after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, disrupted established ways for Russian companies to send money across borders. Investigative outlet Proekt reported in spring 2026 that shadow payment intermediaries had grown in response, with many operating offices in Moscow City. ICIJ’s later reporting adds detail about how one of those services obtains and moves funds.
A7 is owned by Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor, who was convicted of fraud and embezzlement in Moldova, and PSB, a Russian state-owned bank. Shor holds a controlling stake, while PSB owns the remaining 49%, according to the source material. PSB became Russia’s designated bank for the Defense Ministry and defense industry in late 2019. The source material also says the state development corporation VEB.RF “provides support” to A7.
Earlier reporting by Proekt cited an anonymous cross-border payments source who estimated A7 handled about 15% of Russia’s cross-border transfers; A7 put its share at 19%. Those figures are attributed estimates, not independently established shares in the ICIJ material. Proekt also reported that A7’s clients included at least 25 Russian companies under U.S. and European Union sanctions, five of them manufacturers or suppliers of combat drones used by Russia’s military. The findings concern reported company relationships and payment activity, not a determination of legal responsibility for every transaction.
““Sadovod is simply a big client base.””
— A source familiar with A7’s market operations, speaking to ICIJ
Limits of the Available Findings
The supplied account does not specify which month saw A7 handle at least 58 metric tons of cash, how that peak was measured, or how the weight translates into a monetary value. It also does not provide a complete accounting of the amounts transferred, the total number of payments, or the share of transactions that followed the route described by ICIJ.
The reporting describes a network based on reviewed internal documents and interviews, but the material available here does not include A7’s response to the findings or a full account of how the company characterizes its activities. It is also unclear which specific recipients, banks or other intermediaries were involved in the transfers examined, and whether authorities have opened or announced any enforcement action connected to this reporting.
Separate claims about Roman Abramovich’s possible role come from Proekt’s sources and should not be treated as established fact. Proekt reported that an anonymous payments-industry source called him A7’s “protector and sponsor”; Abramovich’s representatives denied his involvement. The supplied material does not resolve that dispute.
Questions for Banks and Regulators
The investigation’s publication puts the reported collection points, banking links and overseas intermediaries into public view, but the supplied material names no forthcoming regulatory decision, official inquiry or response deadline. Readers should watch for statements from A7, PSB, relevant authorities and named intermediaries, as well as any further reporting that supplies transaction-level records or clarifies the cash-volume estimate.
Further scrutiny would need to establish which transfers involved restricted entities, how funds were handled by each intermediary, and whether the identified companies or individuals face legal action. Until that information is available, the investigation’s account is evidence about a reported payment route—not proof that every A7 transfer breached sanctions or that every participant had the same knowledge or role.
Key Questions
What is A7?
A7 is a Russian cross-border payment service owned by Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor and state-owned Promsvyazbank, according to the source material. The investigation describes it as an intermediary handling payments outside ordinary routes disrupted by sanctions.
How does the reported transfer route work?
According to ICIJ, cash collected at Moscow markets is taken to an A7 processing center and then deposited through PSB. Intermediaries in Kyrgyzstan buy cryptocurrency, which is routed through companies in other countries and exchanged for local currency before reaching recipients.
What does the 58-metric-ton figure mean?
The source says A7 processed at least 58 metric tons of cash in one month at its peak. It does not specify the month or provide a monetary equivalent, so the figure cannot be treated as a ruble total or a general monthly average.
Does the investigation prove that every A7 payment violated sanctions?
No. The supplied material describes A7’s network and reports that some clients were under U.S. and EU sanctions, but it does not establish that every transfer violated sanctions or determine legal responsibility for each payment.
What is known about Roman Abramovich’s alleged involvement?
Proekt reported claims from anonymous sources suggesting Abramovich had a role in A7, while his representatives denied involvement. The available material does not resolve those conflicting statements.
Source: rss
